Tag: condominiums

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Litigation Property Disputes Real Estate Law Residential Real Estate

Suing a Condo Corporation for a Delay in Repairs

What a condominium corporation’s obligations to individual owners with respect to repairs? If an owner is unsatisfied with the response to repeated complaints, are they entitled to damages? When might a condo corporation’s failure to address an issue to an owner’s satisfaction be considered oppressive?

A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dealt with these questions, following a five-year battle between a condominium owner and the corporation.

A Five-Year Complaint History

The complainant had purchased a unit on the top floor of a 15-storey condominium building. Four years after moving in, she began to notice an excessively loud noise emanating from what sounded like an industrial fan or a motor on the roof of the building that disturbed her significantly. She made a verbal complaint to the condominium corporation in 2014 about the noise and when nothing was done, she made a further complaint in writing.

In 2019, five years after the owner’s initial complaint, the condominium corporation replaced two exhaust fans that were located above the owner’s unit. While the noise was still present, the owner said that this helped to reduce it significantly. The complainant brought an action against the condo corporation for failure to meet its statutory obligations with respect to repairs and maintenance, as well as oppression.

What Exactly Are a Condominium Corporation’s Obligations?

Under ss. 89 and 90 of the Ontario Condominium Act, a corporation does have a statutory obligation to repair and maintain the common elements of a condominium:

89 (1) Subject to sections 91 and 123, the corporation shall repair the units and common elements after damage.

90 (1) Subject to section 91, the corporation shall maintain the common elements and each owner shall maintain the owner’s unit.

However, the court, in this case, was careful to point out that the standard of a corporation’s obligation is one of reasonableness. In this case, there was no evidence that the complained-about noise had occurred as a result of a failure to properly repair or maintain the fans that were eventually replaced. Further, there was evidence that the corporation had ensured that the fans were inspected and maintained on a regular basis, going back to before the complaints began.

To address the noise complaints, the corporation brought in a third party company to inspect the fans, and no underlying cause of the noise was found. The same company inspected the fans again six months later, and then six months after that. On the last visit, the company installed new blower assemblies on the fans above the complainant’s unit in an attempt to make them quieter.

In 2018, the complainant hired an acoustic engineer to inspect the fans. His report showed that the fans were old, contained some rust and did not appear to have any acoustic or vibration insulation. However, he did not test the fans beyond inspecting them visually.

Three months later, the corporation retained mechanical engineers to inspect the fans. The engineers recommended some servicing to address a slight bearing noise on one fan and said the other was actually quieter than industry standards. The corporation carried out the recommended service but the complainant said that the sound persisted.

Given the fact that the fans were regularly inspected and maintained, and that the corporation had the fans inspected by engineers specifically to address the complaints, it could not be said that the corporation had violated a reasonable standard of repair and maintenance. Further, the complainant alleged that the noise had been due to a failure to maintain the fans, but also said the noise persisted even after the service recommended by mechanical engineers had taken place.

Was the Corporation’s Conduct Oppressive?

The complainant alleged that the corporation had ignored her complaints and failed to address a serious issue that was highly disruptive for five years. However, the court found that this ignored several steps the corporation took during that time frame to identify and address the noise she complained of. When the corporation eventually did order new fans, the complainant, through her lawyer, objected to the manufacturer’s installation instructions, based on the opinion of a consultant she had retained to review them. The installation was delayed for nearly nine months due to this objection, and eventually, the complainant allowed the corporation to proceed with the original instructions.

While the corporation’s response had some faults, including failing to respond in writing initially, and then providing a memo from the superintendent that was dismissive and sarcastic in tone, overall the response was reasonable in the given circumstances. On the issue of oppression, the court ultimately concluded that:

A unit owner seeking an oppression remedy under the Condominium Act must show both that there was a breach of their reasonable expectations and that those reasonable expectations were breached by conduct legitimately characterized as oppressive. I find that [the complainant] had a reasonable expectation that [the corporation] would comply with its statutory obligations to repair and maintain its common elements. I also find that [the corporation] acted reasonably and in compliance with these obligations.

While condominium owners certainly have a right to expect action from their condominium corporation when it comes to the repair and maintenance of the common elements, the standard of reasonableness must be kept in mind. Prior to initiating a potentially costly and time-consuming action in court, a complainant should carefully consider whether they will be able to establish that the corporation failed to meet the reasonableness standard under the given circumstances.

At Baker & Company in Toronto, our lawyers take the time to meet with you and understand your unique needs in order to guide you through your real estate matter, whether commercial or residential.  We rely on our broad base of experience and expertise to provide exceptional legal advice and risk management in a variety of transactions, disputes, or through the litigation process. Call us at 416-777-0100 or contact us online for a consultation.

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Real Estate Law Residential Real Estate

What Constitutes a ‘Material Change’ to an Agreement of Purchase and Sale?

A recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA) was faced with determining whether a condominium corporation’s failure to begin construction on a parkette and entry gates by the closing date on a unit in the development constituted a ‘material change’ to the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS).

The Background Facts

The appellant had purchased a new construction condominium for $1.6 million, putting down a deposit of $133,000 at the time of signing the APS. The closing date was set for December 13, 2017. A month before the closing date, the builder notified the appellant’s lawyer that the condominium unit was ready for occupancy and that the transaction would be closing as planned.

The appellant’s lawyer requested an extension of the closing date by a month, as the appellant had been unable to secure a mortgage for the balance of the purchase price. The respondent agreed to an extension of one week. On the new closing date, the appellant’s lawyer contacted the respondent and requested a further extension of one day, to allow the appellant “to investigate an issue related to the property”. The respondent consented.

The following day, the appellant’s lawyer contacted the respondent again to say that, contrary to the Disclosure Statement, the construction of a parkette and exit and entry gates had not yet been started. As a result, the appellant wished to extend the closing until those common elements had been completed. The lawyer further stated that their client reserved the right to rescind the APS completely if the respondent no longer planned to construct those elements, pursuant to s. 74 of the Condominium Act (the “Act”). The respondent replied by saying that the appellant had failed to close the transaction and that the respondent was terminating the APS and retaining the deposit.

The respondent later sold the unit for $1.3 million to another purchaser, $300,000 less than the amount in the original APS. The appellant brought an action for the return of her deposit and a determination that she had rightfully rescinded the APS, and the respondent claimed damages for breach of the APS.

Lower level decision

In the original decision, the trial judge considered the appellant’s argument that the respondent’s failure to begin construction of the parkette and entry/exit gates by the date of closing amounted to a ‘material change’ of the APS. In doing so, the court looked at the definition of ‘material change’ under s. 74(2) of the Condominium Act:

[A] change or series of changes that a reasonable purchaser, on an objective basis, would have regarded collectively as sufficiently important to the decision to purchase a unit or proposed unit in the corporation that it is likely that the purchaser would not have entered into the agreement of purchase and sale for the unit or the proposed unit or would have exercised the right to rescind such an agreement of purchase and sale under section s. 73, if the disclosure statement had contained the change or series of changes, but does not include,

…

[A] change in the schedule of the proposed commencement and completion dates for the amenities of which construction had not been completed as of the date on which the disclosure statement was made.

The court went on to say:

The test for what is a “material change” provides some guidance as to what the legislature considered to be fundamental to an agreement of purchase and sale of a condominium such that if that change occurred, the Purchaser was entitled to end the agreement. The legislature did not consider a change in the construction schedule for amenities to be a material change.

Ultimately, the court found that the issues relied upon by the appellant were not sufficient to rescind the APS, and dismissed the appellant’s action, finding in favour of the respondent. The appellant then appealed the decision.

The Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal (ONCA) found no fault in the original decision. With respect to s. 74(2) of the Act, the ONCA affirmed the lower court’s interpretation. The appellant further argued that the lower court had erred in characterizing the parkette and gates as ‘amenities’ rather than essential features of the community. The ONCA disagreed, citing a clause of the original APS, which read:

In any event, the Purchaser acknowledges that failure to complete other units within the Condominium in which the Unit is located, or the common elements on or before the Occupancy Date shall not be deemed to be a failure to complete the unit.

Ultimately, this case demonstrates that purchasers of new construction real estate must exercise extreme care when seeking to rescind an APS, or considering the option of not closing on the set date. The financial ramifications can be quite significant. If considering such actions, it would be prudent to seek advice from a knowledgable lawyer well in advance fo the closing date in order to review all potential options.

At Baker & Company in Toronto, our real estate lawyers take the time to meet with you and understand your unique needs in order to guide you through your real estate matter, whether commercial or residential.  We rely on our broad base of experience and expertise to provide exceptional legal advice and risk management in a variety of transactions, or through litigation. Call us at 416-777-0100 or contact us online for a consultation.

Categories
Property Disputes Real Estate Law Residential Real Estate

Condominium Corporation Not Permitted to Reopen Approval Process for Structural Changes

A home renovation can be a long and drawn-out process; one that causes great inconvenience to a homeowner and may require extensive permissions before it can even begin. Anyone who undertakes a major renovation after completing the due diligence to obtain the necessary permits would be justifiably surprised and upset if said authorization was revoked after the work had been completed. That is just what occurred in a conflict that was recently decided by the Ontario Superior Court between condominium owners and the condominium corporation. The dispute centred around the lack of an agreement under s. 98 of the Condominium Act (the “Act”).

What is a s. 98 Agreement?

Before looking at the case itself, it is helpful to review the purpose of s. 98 of the Act. This section requires that an owner enter into an agreement with the condominium corporation before making any changes that affect the common elements of a condominium. If the changes are approved, the corporation will enter into an agreement with the owner(s) with the primary purpose of setting out the following terms:

  • To apportion the cost of the proposed change(s) between the owner(s) and the corporation;
  • To set out the maintenance, repair, and insurance obligations with respect to the proposed change(s).

Generally, once an agreement is executed, it will be registered on title for the property.

Background of the Case

The applicants in the case at hand were the owners of one unit in a twenty-unit condominium in Muskoka. Soon after purchasing the unit, the applicant husband was appointed to the Board of Directors (the “Board”), a role that he filled for three years. At one point the applicants expressed an interest in buying another unit in the building in order to accommodate more visitors, and the owners of the unit next door to theirs advised them that they were planning to sell. Before committing to purchase the unit, the applicants submitted a proposal to the Board seeking approval to create an opening between the two units in order to create one large condominium. The changes would affect a common element in the building, being the shared wall between the two units.

At the time of the proposal, the Board consisted of four members, one being the applicant husband and another being the owner of the unit next door to the applicants. All four of the Board members were present for the meeting, along with the property manager. However, the owner of the unit the applicant wanted to purchase declared a conflict of interest and excused himself for the relevant portion of the meeting. The applicant remained for the entire meeting but abstained from voting on his proposal. The proposal was approved, leading the applicants to then purchase the condominium from their neighbour. At the meeting, those present had discussed the need for a formal agreement under s. 98 of the Act, but one was never put into place. At the time, the condominium corporation was in the habit of approving changes to common elements without a formal s. 98 agreement.

The applicants completed extensive renovations, opening the connecting wall between the units, and removing the kitchen in one unit to create a more cohesive single condominium. After the changes had been completed, a new Board president was elected. The new president took issue with the lack of a s. 98 agreement with respect to the applicants’ renovations, and all other changes that had been made by other condo owners. It was decided that all owners who had made changes affecting common elements would be required to enter into retroactive agreements. The applicants were provided with an agreement to sign, which contained a clause not found in the agreements received by other owners. It stated as follows:

The Improvements shall be removed by the Unit Owner, at the Unit Owner’s sole expense, before the Unit is sold.  Specifically, the Unit shall be restored to the condition before the Improvements were made, including but not limited to the reinstallation of the common element demising wall within the Unit and any changes that were made by the Unit Owner related thereto.  

The Court’s Ruling

The applicants brought a claim against the corporation, saying that the clause overreached by requiring the restoration of changes unrelated to the common elements. They claimed that the corporation’s behaviour was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial in light of the fact that the changes had already been approved and completed, and the agreements provided to the other owners did not contain a similar clause. The corporation responded saying that the permission previously granted was invalid due to the applicant’s conflict of interest, which resulted in a non-quorum at the meeting, and cited the lack of a s. 98 agreement to further invalidate the approval.

The court found in favour of the applicants, reasoning:

Board approval was sufficient and was given.  [The applicant] did not have a conflict because the proposal was not material to the Condominium.  There was therefore a quorum.  The approval is not problematic as a result of these issues. I therefore conclude that there was an effective Board approval given for the structural change made by the applicants.  The relief sought by the Condominium, which assumes that it can begin the approval process again, is therefore inappropriate.

The court awarded the applicants $10,000 in general damages due to the corporation’s oppressive and unfair conduct. The court did agree that a s. 98 agreement was necessary but ordered the overreaching language in the oppressive clause be removed. The applicants will be required to restore the common wall prior to selling either unit, but would not be required to say, reinstall a kitchen in the second unit. The changes unrelated to the wall would not be covered by a s. 98 agreement as they are not common elements. The applicants would be under no obligation to restore them since restoration was not contemplated at the time approval was granted.

This case should be a lesson to condominium boards regarding the importance of putting a s. 98 agreement into place from the start and setting out all expectations with respect to changes affecting any common elements. A corporation will likely be prevented from placing an unfair onus on condominium owners after the fact if that onus is deemed to be oppressive or unfair.

At Baker & Company in Toronto, we take the time to meet with you and understand your unique needs in order to guide you through your real estate matter, whether commercial or residential.  We rely on our broad base of experience and expertise to provide exceptional legal advice and risk management in a variety of transactions, or through litigation. Call us at 416-777-0100 or contact us online for a consultation.